Abstract. Firms interested in servicing foreign markets face a difficult decision with regards to the choice of an entry mode. The options available to a firm include exporting, licensing, joint venture and sole venture. Several factors that determine the choice of a specific foreign market entry mode have been identified in previous literature. These factors can be classified into three categories: ownership advantages of a firm, location advantages of a market, and internalization advantages of integrating transactions. This study examines the independent and joint influences of these factors on the choice of an entry mode. Multinomial logistic regression model is employed to test the hypothesized effects.
While these studies have made substantial contributions to our understanding of the entry mode behavior of firms, an important gap in the empirical literature is the issue of how the inter-relationships among the deterninant factors influence firms' entry choices.2 The importance of examining the effects of inter-relationships derives from the fact that they may explain firn behaviors that cannot be captured by the independent effects of the factors. For example, firms that have lower levels of ownership advantages are expected to either not enter foreign markets or use a low-risk entry mode such as exporting. However, many such firms have been observed to enter foreign countries, especially those that have high market potential, using joint ventures and licensing arrangements [Talaga, Chandran & Phatak 1985] . This type of firm behavior can be better explained if the joint effect of ownership advantages of the firm and location advantages of the market is examined. A critical theme that this study pursues is the examination of a number of such firm behaviors by evaluating the joint impact of a set of determinants.
A methodological feature of this study is the use of the survey technique to obtain information on the determinant factors. An important advantage of this technique is that it provides direct measures (as compared to proxy variables used by most researchers) of both location and internalization factors. The direct measures are obtained by evaluating managerial perceptions about market potential and investment risks (location advantages), and costs of writing and enforcing contracts, risk of deterioration in the quality of services, and risk of dissipation of knowledge (internalization advantages) in a given host country. Perceptual measures are particularly useful in the measurement of internalization advantages since past experience has shown that it is a difficult construct to quantify. Unlike location advantages, CHOICE OF FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY MODE 3 indicators of internalization advantages have not been appropriately identified in the entry mode literature to date.3 Managerial perceptions are also relevant for the assessment of the location advantages of a specific country. While previous research has assumed that the location advantages are exogenous4 and hence constant across firms for a given host country, our study allows us to measure these variables as a function of the perceptions of managers. It should be noted that these perceptions may be different due to variations in managers' past experiences in that country (and other countries), level of knowledge about that country, individual biases, etc. There is wide support from the organizational behavior literature for the importance of managerial perceptions in decisionmaking [Cyert and March 1963] . The remainder of the paper is organized into three parts. The first part reviews the relevant literature to develop the hypotheses. The second part details the research setting, the operational measures, data collection, and research method. The last section provides the results and discusses important managerial, theoretical, and public policy implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Normative decision theory suggests that the choice of a foreign market entry mode should be based on trade-offs between risks and returns. A firm is expected to choose the entry mode that offers the highest risk-adjusted return on investment. However, behavioral evidence indicates that a firm's choices may also be determined by resource availability and need for control [Cespedes 1988; Stopford and Wells 1972] . Resource availability refers to the financial and managerial capacity of a firm for serving a particular foreign market. Control refers to a firm's need to influence systems, methods, and decisions in that foreign market [Anderson and Gatignon 1986] . Control is desirable to improve a firm's competitive position and maximize the returns on its assets and skills. Higher operational control results from having a greater ownership in the foreign venture. However, risks are also likely to be higher due to the assumption of responsibility for decisionmaking and higher commitment of resources.
Entry mode choices are often a compromise among these four attributes. The exporting mode is a low resource (investment) and consequently low risk/return alternative. This mode, while providing a firm with operational control, lacks in providing marketing control that may be essential for market seeking firms. The sole venture mode, on the other hand, is a high investment and consequently high risk/return alternative that also provides a high degree of control to the investing firm. The joint venture mode involves relatively lower investment and hence provides risk, return, and control commensurate to the extent of equity participation of the investing firm. Finally, the licensing mode is a low investment, low risk/return alternative which provides least control to the licensing firm.
By including firm-specific and market-specific factors that influence these criteria (control, return, risk, and resources), Dunning [1977 Dunning [ , 1980 Dunning [ , 1988 developed a framework for explaining choice among exporting, licensing, joint venture, and sole venture modes (see Figure 1) . A brief description of the main effects of these factors is presented below and is mainly used for validating the results of this study. The main thrust of this research is on examining the effects of interrelationships among these independent factors. A detailed discussion of these effects is presented in the next section.
Ownership Advantages
To compete with host country firms in their own markets, firms must possess superior assets and skills that can earn economic rents that are high enough to counter the higher cost of servicing these markets. A firm's asset power is reflected by its size and multinational experience, and skills by its ability to develop differentiated products. When a firm possesses the ability to develop differentiated products, it may run the risk of loss of long-term revenues if it shares this knowledge with host country firms. This is because the latter may acquire this knowledge and decide to operate as a separate entity at a future date. 
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Ownership Advantages and Contractual Risk
The main effect of internalization advantage suggested that firms will refrain from entering a country if the perceived risk of dissipation of knowledge, risk of deterioration of quality of services, and costs of writing and enforcing contracts are high. This is particularly critical for firms that have specialized knowledge, protection of which must be an important priority [Hill, Hwang and Kim 1990]. However, these firms are also interested in maximizing the economic rents on their knowledge (as suggested by the main effect of this factor). This creates a decision scenario in which the need for protection will be traded against return potential. Lack of protection would make sharing of specialized knowledge risky in the long run particularly since it would limit the flexibility a firm has in adapting to future contingencies. Since a flexible arrangement is difficult to achieve in a contractual setting, a firm that has specialized knowledge will be expected to opt for an internal organization. On the other hand, when the contractual risks are low, a firm may be more willing to share its specialized knowledge. This is because as the risk of dissipation falls, the opportunity for mutually beneficial contractual arrangements increases at the expense of an internal market [Rugman 1981 ]. This opportunity also will be higher in countries where the cost of writing and enforcing contracts is low. For those firms that do not possess any specialized knowledge, the presence of contractual risks may not be a critical issue. These firms may be willing to opt for contractual arrangements even when the contractual risks are high [Rugman 1982 
Data Collection
The preliminary questionnaire instrument comprising the above scales was discussed with the presidents of four leasing companies as well as with three academicians. Based on their comments, some of the questionnaire items were modified. The revised questionnaire was then pre-tested with ten randomly selected finns. The objective of this test was to confirm that the items were understandable and unambiguous. The questionnaire was modified on the basis of comments received during the pre-test.
The population of leasing firms in the U.S. comprised 1196 firms in the year 1986. After excluding firms that were owned by foreign firms, firms whose business was confined to a city or town and that was not even regional or national, and firms which used leasing to support their other primary businesses (e.g. investment bankers), the population was reduced to 550 firms. This was further reduced to 536 firms after excluding firms that were used in preliminary tests. Key informants for the information needed for this study were designated to be either the President or CEO of the firm.
Discussions with executives during the pre-test phase of the study led to the conclusion that only the CEO/ President had complete knowledge required for this study. Efforts were therefore made to make the responses of these key informants as representative of the true situation as possible. The guidelines provided by Huber and Power [1985] for using a single informant in terms of motivation of informants to cooperate with the study seriously, assessment of alternate framing of questions, and use of structured questions were strictly followed in this study. The final questionnaire was mailed to the Presidents or the CEOs of the study sample. The first wave of mailing to 536 firms, followed by a second wave of mailing to 250 firns, yielded responses from 119 finns, resulting in a response rate of 22.8%. Out of the 119 firns, 22 were excluded since they contained large numbers of missing values, resulting in a final sample of 97 firms. Since each firm provided its choices and evaluations for three countries, the total number of observations available for statistical analysis was 285 (six choices had to be omitted due to missing values).
Research Method
Factor analysis was used to assess the psychometric properties of the study constructs. Since size and multinational experience indicators were highly correlated (and the hypothesized relationships were parallel), these were combined to form a single factor. After confirming the unidimensional nature of the constructs, internal consistency among the items was further assessed by estimating coefficient alpha and dropping items with low itemto-total correlations. Finally, the reduced set of items was rechecked for internal consistency via factor analysis, confirming the original unidimensional nature of the constructs obtained [Nunnally 1978 ]. The factor loadings structure was employed to determine the factor scores of each firm on the five constructs. All the scale items loaded highly on factors (constructs) they represented, and weakly on other factors. The five factors accounted for 73.3% of the total variation in the sample (see Table 1 Multinomial logistic regression was then used to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the main effect and interaction parameters. Three separate models were evaluated: (1) using "no involvement" as the base case from which deviations are interpreted (Model I), (2) excluding the "no involvement" option and using "exporting" as the base case (Model II), and (3) excluding "no involvement" and "exporting" options and using joint venture as the base case (Model III). All three of these models fit the data very well. A total of 62.5%, 68.0% and 70.3% of the observations are classified correctly in the three models respectively, compared to 34.0%, 48.0% and 56.6% that would have been expected due to chance. In addition, two logit models, one including interaction terms and the other excluding these terms, were estimated to determine the overall relevance of the interaction terms. Inclusion of the six interaction terms helped the log likelihood ratio to decrease by 51.81, 44.28, and 5.31, respectively for Models I, II, and III. In addition, the inclusion of the interaction terms resulted in a change in chi-square values by 103.62, 88.56, and 10.64, respectively for Models I, II, and III, with a corresponding change of 18, 12, and 6 degrees of freedom (also see Table 2 ). The changes in chi-square values are significant at the .001 level for Models I and II suggesting strong evidence for including the interaction terms in the choice model, and at the .101 level for Model III, suggesting moderate evidence for including the interaction terms in the choice model. The results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 2 . The logistic regression results evaluate the effects of the interacting variables when both are high or low. However, they cannot distinguish the effects of the interacting variables when one of the variables has a high value and the other a low value. These effects were therefore evaluated using chi-square analysis after splitting the sample into high and low categories for each of the interacting variables (Table 3) .
RESULTS
Main Effects
The main effect results confirm, with one exception, previous empirical findings in the entry mode literature. Larger and more multinational firms With reference to the location advantages, it was found that firms preferred to enter the more potential markets using investment modes (Model I and II) and among those markets that were chosen for investments, finns preferred sole venture in markets that were perceived to have higher market potential (Model III). On the other hand, firms tend to avoid markets that have high investment risks (Model I, II, and III), while choosing to only export to markets that have high contractual risks (Model I, II and III).
Interaction Effects
The interaction effects are evaluated using results from both logistic regression (Table 2 ) and cross-tabulation results (Table 3) . The regression estimates provide information on the significance of the high/high and low/low combinations of the interacting variables, while the cross-tabulations examine the significance of the high/low and low/high combinations of the interacting variables. The results are presented for each hypothesis separately.
Hi: Table 3 shows that larger and more multinational firms have a higher propensity to choose sole venture and joint venture modes, and a lower propensity for no involvement in low potential countries, supporting H1. This confirms our expectation that such firms may be guided more by strategic considerations than by cost-benefit trade-offs in such markets.
H2: 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The major objective of this study was to examine the effect of interrelationships among a firm's ownership (ability to develop differentiated products, size and multinational experience), location (market potential and investment risk) and internalization advantages (contractual risks) on its choice of entry modes in foreign markets. The results provide broad support for the hypothesized effects of the interrelationships, while simultaneously confiming previous findings on the separate effects of each type of determinant.
The findings of this study imply that though firns would like to establish market presence in foreign countries through direct investment, their ability to do so is constrained by their size and multinational experience. In addition, while the results support the general belief that firms use investment modes only in high potential markets, they also suggest that some firms (large multinationals) may invest in relatively lower potential markets if their strategic objectives dictate so. However, firms are hesitant to enter markets that are considered risky. Such caution appears understandable. The longterm success of any foreign investment requires significant managerial and financial resources even in markets that do not have high risks. In a high risk situation, firms could make a risk-averse choice resulting in the market being not served.
In addition to the preference for investment modes by large multinational firms in lower potential markets, a number of other interesting interaction effects emerged from the study. First, small firms with limited multinational experience were found to prefer entry into markets that were perceived to have high potential through a joint venture. This result indicates that smaller, less multinationally experienced firms need to complement their resource needs in order to service a potentially attractive foreign market. As argued in the hypotheses section, the sharing of costs and risks enables such firms to reduce the long-term uncertainty more efficiently [Beamish and Banks 1987]. Second, firms that have higher ability to develop differentiated products are concerned about the possible loss of their advantage in countries that are perceived as having higher contractual risks. They show a strong dislike for the exporting mode, but are willing to choose investment modes in such markets. This can be attributed to the fact that the long-term success of leasing operations in a foreign market is highly dependent on a firm's ability to enforce contractual obligations by the lessee or the partner firm. In a personal interview with a leading multinational leasing firm, it was revealed that the firm did not wish to export equipment to a middle eastern nation because, regardless of the nature of the contract, the equipment became the property of the ruler of that nation. It is probably much safer to engage in leasing activity by investing in that nation and operating within the framework of the domestic laws. Third, the results reveal that while finms are interested in entering markets that are perceived to have high potential, the existence of investment risks leads them to shy away from investments. In such countries firms prefer to simply export. It is interesting to note that the main effect of investment risk suggested no entry while that of market potential suggested investment modes. The combined effect suggests that firms take a risk-averse stance and choose limited involvement in such markets.
From an entry mode perspective, exporting is preferred to (a) no involvement, if firms have the ability to develop differentiated products and if contractual risks are high (this effect is considerably weakened for firms with the ability to develop differentiated products); (b) a joint venture if contractual risks are high; and (c) a sole venture if contractual risks are high. On the other hand, preference for exporting is found to be relatively low in high potential markets indicating that high return/high risk investment modes are better modes in such markets. These results imply a tendency to avoid entry through exporting when the potential returns through other modes are high, and prefer entry through exporting when the potential risks for other modes are high. The joint venture mode is preferred by larger and more multinational firms. It is also preferred by smaller and less multinational firms in high potential markets. On the other hand, this mode is not preferred when contractual and investment risks (even in high market potential countries) are high. When firns have the ability to develop differentiated products, they prefer this mode in higher potential markets and in markets that have higher contractual risks. The last result is perplexing, even though it stipulates that the main effect of contractual risks will be weakened by the presence of product differentiation ability. The sole venture mode is also preferred by large, multinational firms (more so than those choosing joint venture), and in markets with higher potential. Firms, in general, do not prefer the sole venture when contractual and investment risks (even in high market potential countries) are high. But, when finns have higher ability to develop differentiated products, they may enter markets that are perceived to have high contractual risks using this mode. This means that firms tend to offset these risks through higher levels of product differentiation. This implies that firmns draw greater market power not from size but from the advantages that they gain through product differentiation. The trend towards globalization has meant that not only are multinational firms taking a global view of their strategies but also countries are beginning to recognize that their economic development strategies must take on a global dimension. This study shows that firms that have a higher preference for investment entry modes are sensitive to investment/contractual risk-related attributes. The governments in host countries, therefore, will not only have to develop policies that make it attractive for foreign firms to invest in their markets, but more importantly, will have to reduce their risk perceptions through regulations that permit repatriation of profits, majority ownership and control, patent protection for technology/products and enforcement of contracts. From the government's perspective, it should be noted that, regardless of the stage of economic development of the country, policy variables that reduce the risk will have a positive impact on inward foreign direct investment and technology transfer. Recent trends indicate a move by developing countries to do just this, whereby conditions are being created for a more favorable investment climate through relaxation of investment controls and provision of investment incentives including better protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts. Under these circumstances, firms with higher ownership advantages can derive pioneering benefits by being the first to enter these countries. For instance, Pepsi gained entry into India through a complex contractual arrangement (with 39.9% equity joint venture) primarily because as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Pepsi-Cola International, Mr. Robert H. Beeby said, "We're willing to go so far with India because we wanted to make sure we get an early entry while the market is developing" [Spaeth and Naj 1988] . This gives Pepsi access to a large market that is expected to become less riskier in terms of enforcing contracts.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The major objective of this study was to examine the impact that interrelationships among ownership, location, and internalization advantage factors had 
